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JUDGE GRIER'S CHARGE.
In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District
of Pennsylvania.
WILLI&M MCCOY VS. THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON.

1. The Pennsylvania Act of 12th April, 1851, authorizing the County of Washington
to subscribe to the stock of the llempfield Railroad, and to issue in payment for
the subscription, the bonds of the county, is not a violation of either the constitution of the State or of the United States.
2. The issue of coupon bonds was authorized by the Act.
3. It is not necessary in a suit by the holder of the bonds or the coupons to show
that a subscription was in fact made, the bond reciting the fact.
4. Parol evidence of an agreement between the Railroad company and the Commissioners of the County, that the county should not be called upon for the interest,
is inadmissible to affect the right of the holder of the coupons to recover.
5. A county, as a municipal corporation, may be sued in the courts of the United States.
6. The holder of a coupon bond payable to bearer, being a citizen of a different
State from the defendants, and entitled to sue in the courts of the United States,
though the previous holder of the bond might not have been so entitled to sue.
7. Ccupons are prima fade evidence that the holder is also the holder of the bond
from which they are cut, or else was so when they were separated.

This was an action against the county of Washington upon sixty
coupons, for thirty dollars each, on bonds of the county of WashVoL. VII-13
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ington, issued by the commissioners of that county to the Hempfield
Railroad.
It appeared, amongst other things, on the trial of the case, that
the commissioners of the county at the time of the issue of the bonds,
objected to signing them because they did not contain on their face
the provision of the Act of Assembly authorizing their issue, which
makes it the business of the company to pay the interest on the bonds,
till such time as the road shall be completed; this objection, was
however, removed by a distinct understanding with the President of
the road, who pledged the company to carry out the provision of the
statute in good faith. They also denied that any subscription had
ever been made by the county to the capital stock of the road, or
that any certificate of stock had been issued to the company. It
was proven, however, that the county had voted the stock at every
election held since the execution and delivery of the bonds.
Geo. P. Hamilton, Jsq., appeared for the plaintiff, and
MJessrs. Thomas Williams, Braden and Hopkins, for the defendants.
The charge to the jury was delivered by GRIE,

J:

Gentlemen of the jury: The case on which you have now to render your verdict is an action of debt for interest due on certain
bonds, called coupon bonds, issued by the commissioners of Washington county.
The declaration sets forth, that the defendants "made certain
coupon warrants, or promises to pay, in writing," in the form following:
"Washington county bonds-Warrant for thirty dollars interest on bond, No.
108, payable in the city of New York, on the 15th of May. 1857.
For the commissioners,
A. SILVY, Clerk."

Sixty of these coupons, for thirty dollars each, payable at different dates, are claimed to be due and owing to the plaintiff as lawful
holder.
The defendants plead they did not assume, and are not so indebted.
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To support the issue, the plaintiff has given in evidence1. An Act of Assembly, passed on the 12th of April, 1851, which,
in sections 7, 8, 9, and 10, authorizes the citizens of Washington,
at the next, or some subsequent general election, to decide by ballot
whether or not the commissioners of said county shall subscribe in
its behalf, four thousand shares in the capital stock of the Hempfield
Railroad Company, the returns of this election to be certified to the
Court of Quarter Sessions, and if the judges thereof ascertain that
there is a majority in favor of such subscription, they shall make
an order on the commissioners to make the subscription.
The commissioners are authorized to borrow money to pay said
subscription, and to execute bonds or promissory notes in the name
of the county, transferable on the books of the commissioners: these
bonds to bear an interest of six per cent., payable semi-annually,
and may be received as cash by the Hempfield Railroad Company,
in payment of instalments.
2. The plaintiff has given in evidence also, a certificate from the
Court of Quarter Sessions, showing that such election was held, and
that the citizens of Washington had decided, by a large majority of
votes, in favor of making such subscription.
The will of the people of Washington county being thus ascertained, another Act of Assembly was passed on the 12th of February,
1852, authorizing the commissioners to subscribe 4,000 shares to the
capital stock of the company; to borrow money in behalf of the
county, and to make provision for the payment of the principal
and interest of money so borrowed, as in other cases of loans to
corporations.
The commissioners are authorized also to issue certificates of loan
or bonds in the name of the county, bearing an interest of six per
cent. payable semi-annually, and transferable as may be directed by
the commissioners.
The Railroad company are to receive these bonds as cash in payment of the stock subscribed: "and the said company are also to pay
or provide for the payment of the interest accruing upon said certificates of loan or bonds, until the said railroad shall be completed."
The railroad company is moreover authorized to guarantee the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds.
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In pursuance of this authority the commissioners executed and
delivered to the railroad company 200 bonds of $1,000 each, and
fifty of $500 each, with interest coupons annexed.
[The learned judge here read one of the bonds, with guarantee of
the railroad company and coupons.]
These bonds, in order to give them more value in the market, are
made payable to the holder, and thus by contract made negotiable
by delivery. If the commissioners had power to bind the county
for the payment of the principal and interest of a bond, transferable
by delivery, the coupons which are appended to them, are the
appointed evidence, by the agreement of the parties, to show who is
entitled as holder of the bond to receive the interest due at a particular date. They are attached to the bonds for the convenience of
the officers of the county, and to facilitate their negotiation, and
thereby add to their commercial value. The obligation to pay the
interest is to be found in the bond, not in the coupon. They are
not in words an instrument in writing of a commercial nature, and
having their negotiability by virtue of the law merchant. In terms,
these warrants are not made payable to any particular person or his
order, or even to bearer. They partake of the nature of the peculiar
instrument to which they are attached. They are intended by the
parties to be evidence of debt in the hands of the holder, and proof
of payment when in possession of the debtor. They pass by delivery,
and by the contract of the parties and the usage of the country are
sufficient evidence of a debt to the holder as against the obligors in
the bond. They are of modern invention, and should have the effect
intended by the parties and be governed by the usage of the country,
and not by sharp rules of law applicable to instruments of a different nature. The possession of them is therefore prima facie evidence,
that the holder of them is holder of the bond, or was so at least
when they were cut off, and as such, entitled to receive the interest.
See Ohio vs. Commissionersof Clinton county, 8 Ohio State Reports,
(Ritchfield), 280.
The plaintiff has produced the bonds to which the coupons were
attached, with the exception of seventeen. Their execution is proved
and admitted, and that they were delivered to the railroad company
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in payment for stock and to be used by them to raise money for the
construction of the road. There is no allegation, or proof of any
fraud practiced by the parties in the transaction. The plaintiff has
shown a prima facie title to recover, if you believe the evidence,
which will entitle him to your verdict, unless the defendant has
established some sufficient defence, which we will now consider.
1st. It is contended"1st. That the county of Washington being merely a subordinate political division
of -the State of Pennsylvania, is not a citizen of this State, within the meaning of
the Constitution or the act of Congress, and therefore not suable in this court."

To this we answer, that though the metaphysical entity called a
corporation, may not be physically a citizen, yet the law is well
settled, that it may sue, and be sued in the courts of the United
States, because it is but the name under which a number of persons,
corporators, and citizens may sue and be sued. In deciding the
question of jurisdiction, the court look behind the name to find who
are the parties really in interest. In this case, the parties to be
bound by the judgment, are the people of Washington county. That
defendant is a municipal corporation and not a private one, only
furnishes a stronger reason why a citizen of another State, should
have his remedy in this court, and not in a county where the parties
against whom the remedy is sought, would compose the court and
jury to decide their own case. This point is therefore overruled.
2d. It is objected, moreover, to the jurisdiction of the court" 2d. That the plaintiff being in the position of a mere assignee of the chose

in
action sued upon, and the same being a case wherein a suit could not have been
prosecuted in this court to recover the contract if no assignment had been made
thereof, this court has, under the act of Congress, no cognizance of a suit for the
recovery thereof."

This would be a valid objection, if the plaintiff claimed as endorsee
of a citizen of the State of Pennsylvania. But he does not claim
title through any such assignment, but as holder of the bond to whom
the defendants have directly covenanted to pay the bond and interest.
The indebtedness declared on results from the peculiar nature of the
security. The defendants have agreed to pay the interest to the
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holder of the bond, as well as the principal, and having not done so,
they are directly indebted to such holder for refusing to pay according to contract.
3. We will next consider the question involved in the three following points :
"3d. That the County of Washington being a public corporation, erected for
purposes of local government alone, and standing upon no contract between the
legislature and the citizens, and the said Hempfield Railroad Company being a
private corporation merely, organized for purposes of trade and commerce, and as a
common carrier of merchandise and passengers beyond the limits of said county,
the commissioners thereof were not, therefore, authorized to embark either the credit
or property of the people of said county in the hazards of such an enterprise, without their unanimous consent.
4th. That if the same was done under the authority of an Act of the Legislature,
and without such consent, the County Commissioners were pro hac vice the agents
of the legislature only, and the contract so made was not the contract of the people
of the said county.
5th. That as an exercise of mere power on the part of the legislature, in thus
practically compelling the people of one county to build railroads in another, and
taking the freehold of the citizen without his consent for such a purpose, by authorizing a heavy incumbrance thereupon, the said Act of Assembly was no legitimate
exercise of the taxing or of any legislative power; inconsistent with the principles
of natural justice, with the rights of property, and the fundamental law of every free
government, and at war with the great principles enunciated in our Declaration of
Rights, and equally at war with the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United
States."

These three points may be said to contain a condensed argument
against the constitutional power of the legislature to authorize the
commissioners to bind the people of the county to pay debts incurred
in these disastrous speculations.
This is the great question in the case, and if it were a new one which
this court were compelled to decide without the light of precedents, we
should feel oppressed with its magnitude and importance. But happily, we are relieved from this responsibility. The supreme court
of your State, the tribunal to whom alone is committed the high
function of declaring the constitutional powers of the legislature,
have decided.this question,- and to that decision this court and all
the good citizens of the Commonwealth are bound to submit, a
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the declared law of the land. Although, in the course of this trial,
I may have expressed opinions which I possibly might have entertained had I been compelled to meet this as a new question ; as a
member of this court, I must instruct you that the law in question
is constitutional, and that the commissioners of the county had power
and authority to bind the county in conformity with the provisions
of the acts already referred to; and if the bonds have been so issued
and put in circulat*ion, the county is bound by law, as well as by
every principle of moral rectitude, to pay them to the bona fide and
honest holders. Without further enlarging on this subject, let me
refer all who feel desirous to have correct opinions on this subject,
in a moral point of view, to an opinion lately delivered by the learned
and able chief justice of your State.
The following points will be considered together:
"6th. That if the instruments sued on here, or the bonds with which they are connected, were intended for circulation from hand to hand as a marketable commodity,
they are bills of credit within the meaning of the prohibition contained in the first
clause of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United
States.
7th. That the act of Assembly of February 14th, 1852, authorizing the subscription by the Commissioners of Washington county, to the capital stock of the Hempfield Railroad Company, if the same amounted in effect to a lien upon the freehold
of the citizen who holds under a patent from the Commonwealth, it is a law impairing the obligation of the contract between the State and the citizen, and is therefore
in conflict with the first clause of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States.
8th. That the said recited acts of Assembly, in assuming the power to take the
property of the citizen without his consent for a merely private purpose, is equally
a violation of the fundamental principles of Republican government, and is therefore
in conflict with the fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the
United States."

I. In answer to the first of these propositions, I instruct you that
the Constitution of the United States does not forbid States or corporations from borrowing money and giving proper securities therefor, and that such securities are not bills of credit within the meaning of the Constitution.
II. Nor does a law authorizing a county to borrow to make a
railroad on the credit of the county, and to be paid by the imposition
of a tax on the citizens thereof, infringe that article of the Consti-
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tution of the United States which forbids a State to make any "law
impairing the obligation of contracts."
III. Nor is the Act of Assembly in question in violation of "the
fundamental principles of republican government, and therefore in
conflict with any article of the Constitution of the United States."
9. The ninth proposition of the defendants is,
"That if the act, under the authority of which this subscription is claimed
to have been made, originated in the Senate, then, upon the principles on which
such legislation has been sustained in this State, the act itself, as a money or revenue
bill, would be unconstitutional under the twenty-first section of the first article of
the Constitution of this State."

To this I answer, that there is no evidence that said act originated
in the Senate; and if it did7 it is not unconstitutional for that reason.
It is not a bill to "raise revenue" for the State.
10th. The tenth instruction prayed for, is as follows:
"That the instruments declared on import no contract, in their terms, with
the holder thereof by the defendant in this suit to pay the moneys referred to therein,
and are not so executed as to charge the defendants under the laws of this State."

The coupons per so "do not import a contract in their terms with
the holder," but taken in connection with the bond to which they
were attached, they do; and from the established usage and contract
of the parties, they constitute the proper evidence of indebtedness
to charge the defendants.
"11lth. That if the papers in question were originally a part of a bond, or bonds,
containing a stipulation for the payment of the interest referred to therein to the
holder of the said bond, the remedy, if any, would be upon the bond itself, and the
plaintiff must have set out and shown his ownership, and alleged an agreement on
the part of the defendants to pay the same, in order to entitle him to recover."

This proposition is answered in the negative, for reasons already
stated; and see also the case in 8th Ohio Reports, already referred to.
By the contract of the parties, these coupons are made evidence that
the amount of interest stated is due from the county to the holder
thereof.
, 12th. That the bonds issued by the defendants in payment of their supposed
subscription to the capital stock of the Hempfield Railroad are to be construed in
accordance with the terms of the act of Assembly under which the same were issued,
and that, under the said act, the defendants would not be liable for the payment of
interest until the completion of said road."
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The commissioners had their authority from the act, and that
act authorizes them to borrow money to pay for the stock, "to
make provision for the payment of principal and interest," and
to issue bonds in the name of said county, bearing an interest
of six per cent payable semi-annually." The provision that the
railroad company should bind themselves to guarantee the principal
and interest, and should pay it till the road is completed, does not
annul the obligation of the bond; as between the county and the
corporation, the county has a right to call on them to pay the interest.
But as between it and the bondholders the contract of the county is
to pay both principal and interest. The guarantee of the railroad
company adds to the security, but cannot detract from it. The
commissioners have not misconstrued the act, or abused their powers
in binding the county for the payment of the interest, but pursued
its true meaning and intent. On this point, see also a case in point
already referred to in 8 Ohio State Rep. 280.
13th. The thirteenth proposition is:
"That if the said bonds were issued upon an agreement by the company
from which they have been purchased, that the defendants should not be called
upon to pay the interest thereon, but that the same was to be paid by the company
itself until the road was completed, it was an agreement, in effect, that the bonds
should bear no interest so far as the defendants are concerned; and the same not
the equities
being negotiable securities within the law merchant, are subject to all
which existed between the original parties, and the holder was bound to inquire
before purchasing, and is affected with notice of the said agreement."

The written instruments show the contract of the parties, the
parol testimony admitted cannot affect it. What answer would it
be, to an action on a note or bond, for the defendant to plead, that
when he signed it his co-obligor agreed to lift it, and that he should
never be troubled about it.
14th. The fourteenth proposition is:
"That to entitle the plaintiff to recover in this case, be must first have
shown an actual subscription in the manner prescribed by the act incorporating
the said company, or at least an actual subscription of some sort by the commissioners; and that in the absence of any subscription, or of the issue and delivery
of any certificate of stock by the said company, the issue of the bonds was without
authority of law, and the defendants are not liable in this suit."
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This proposition cannot be admitted. The bond recites that it
was for subscription to the stock. The witness has proved that they
were delivered in such payment. Whether there was literally a subscription, or written promise to pay, is of little importance if it was
paid; also whether the county has got a certificate of stock, was a
matter with which the holder of the bond hadino concern, and is not
bound to prove. If the county has no certificate, it can obtain it
by suit, if refused. It cannot now plead the negligence of its own
agents in the management of its business to avoid payment of its
obligations. For anything that appears, they have it, or can get it,
and in absence of proof, the presumption is that they have it.
"16th. That if no subscription was actually made by the commissioners in the
manner indicated by the law, no subsequent vote of theirs by proxy, s3pposing the
same to have been duly proved, could cure the infirmity, or operate as an estoppel
against the defendants."

This has been sufficiently answered in our remarks on the fourteenth proposition. If the bonds were delivered in payment for the
stock, there is no infirmity to be cured.
"16th. That taking the papers sued on to be warrants, or certificates of loan
under the Act of Assembly, it was essential to their validity, as such, that they
should be signed by the commissioners themselves, or a majority of them, and attested in the former case by their clerk, and authenticated in the latter by the seal of
the county."

To this we answer, that the obligation of defendants to pay both
principal and interest, is to be found in the bonds, (as already
explained) which are properly executed by the commissioners, and
bind the defendants to pay the interest as well as the principal.
"17th. That there is nothing in the act authorizing the said subscription to warrant the issue of any other securities than the bonds or certificates of the county
therefor in sums not less than one hundred dollars each, but that, on the contrary,
assuming the instruments sued on to be promises or certificates of debt or loan, and
to have been otherwise well executed, they are in direct violation of the provision
which forbids the issue of any certificates for a less amount than one hundred dollars,
and are, therefore, not obligatory on the defendants.-Act of 1852."

The answer to this proposition is, that the commissioners have
issued no other securities than the bonds, and, as already stated, the
coupons are made for the convenience of the officers, and as evidence
that the holder is the person entitled to receive interest due on the
bond described therein.

